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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a nationwide increase in concern over urbanization
and its negative effects. As a result, legislators and politicians have increasingly
regulated land use to address issues such as urban sprawl and conservation.' The
resulting governmental measures frequently conflict with landowners' freedom to
use their property as they wish. Consequently, the competing interests of the
government and landowners will be presented in the courtroom. As this legal issue
presents itself with more frequency, the law of regulatory takings will become an
increasingly critical area of the law. The law in this area should be as clear as
possible so that governments can draft sound legislation to protect against the
negative effects of irresponsible land use. At the same time, regulatory takings law
should be unambiguous so that the rights of landowners are protected and
development decisions can be planned with certainty.
The basis of regulatory takings law is contained in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, which states that private property shall not "be taken for
public use, without just compensation." 2 The Supreme Court recognized early that
the Constitution would not support a law that purported to take land from one
person and give it to another.' It is clear that "unambiguous governmental seizure
of private property for public use-a sufficiently clear laying-on of official hands
followed by a transfer of possession and title to the general public-is
unconstitutional unless followed by payment to the former owner of the fair market
value of what was taken."4 This quote illustrates the common conception of what
constitutes a taking-a physical invasion of property that alters the owner's
relationship to the thing, preventing him or her from using it.5 In contrast, a
regulatory taking occurs when the government, through regulation, exercises too
much control over a person's property.6
The Supreme Court's seminal decision involving regulatory takings is
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon." In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes stated
that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking."8 These words placed before the Court an issue
that has "plagued [it] for over six decades"--how far is too far?9
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See Dwight H. Merriam & Gurdon H. Buck, Smart Growth. Dumb Takings, 29 ELR 10746
(1999) (discussing the concerns of Vice President Al Gore and President Bill Clinton concerning
urbanization).
2. U.S. Const.amend. V.
3. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (3 Dall.) (1798).
4. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 590 (2 ed. 1988).
5. See id. at 592.
6. Id. at 593.
7. 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922).
8. Id. at 415, 43 S. Ct. at 160.
9. Tribe, supra note 4, at 595-96.
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Recently, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of regulatory takings in City
ofMonterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,'0 but failed to clarify its prior takings
jurisprudence. This note discusses the Supreme Court's opinion in Del Monte
Dunes, focusing on the standard used by the Court in its regulatory takings
jurisprudence.
II. FACTS OF DEL MoNTE DuNES
Del Monte Dunes involved a 37.6-acre tract of oceanfront property owned by
respondent, Del Monte Dunes, and zoned for multifamily residential use under the
city's general zoning ordinance." In 1981, Del Monte Dunes submitted an
application to the Monterey planning commission in order to develop the land in
conformance with the city's zoning and general plan requirements." The plan
submitted by the landowners proposed development of 344 residential units. 3 The
planning commission denied Del Monte Dunes' proposal, indicating that a plan to
develop 264 rather than 344 units would be acceptable. 4 Responding to this
recommendation, Del Monte Dunes submitted a proposal to develop 264 residential
units.' 5 Again, the planning commission denied the proposal, stating that an
application to build 224 units would be approved.'6 Del Monte Dunes followed the
instructions of the planning commission and submitted a 224 unit development
plan.'" Once more, the commission refused to approve the proposal for
development."
After the denial of its third proposal to develop the land, Del Monte Dunes
appealed to the city council, which overruled the denial of the planning commission
and gave the proj ect back to the commission with instructions to consider a plan for
190 units.'9 Subsequently, Del Monte Dunes submitted to the planning commission
detailed site plans for 190 units.2" The planning commission rejected these
plans.2 Del Monte Dunes once again appealed to the city council, which again
overruled the planning commission's decision, conditionally approved Del
10. 526 U.S. 687, 119 S. CL 1624 (1999).
11. Id.at694,119S.Ct.at1631.
12. The land was not in good condition when Del Monte Dunes decided to begin development
ofthe property: a sewer line, surrounded by manmade dunes and fencing, traversed the property. Also,
due to prior use, ice plant had taken over 25% of the parcel and threatened to overtake the remaining
natural vegetation, including the buckwheat plant. The buckwheat plant is the natural habitat of the
Smith's Blue Butterfly, a protected species. However, evidence that the property was home to the
butterfly was scarce. Id. at 695, 119 S. Ct. at 1632.
13. Id. at 695,119 S. Ct. at 1632. The city's zoning regulations allowed for the development of
over 1,000 units on the property. Id.
14. Id. at 695-96, 119 S. Ct. at 1632.









Monte Dunes' plans, and granted an eighteen-month use permit for the
proposed development.22
Almost a year later, Del Monte Dunes submitted its final plan.' The city's
architectural review committee approved the plan, as did the planning commission's
professional staff.2' However, in January 1986, the planning commission again
rejected the proposed development plan.' Del Monte Dunes appealed to the city
council and requested an extension of their use permit in order to allow them time
to satisfy any additional requirements that the council might impose.' The council
granted a temporary extension of the use permit in anticipation of a hearing on the
matter." Nevertheless, after the hearing, the city council rejected the final plan
without specifying possible remedial measures and denied a further extension of Del
Monte Dunes' use permit. 28 After five years, five formal decisions, and nineteen
different site plans, Del Monte Dunes filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the
city's denial of the final development proposal was, among other things, an
uncompensated, and therefore, unconstitutional regulatory taking. 9
The district court dismissed the claims as unripe.-" However, the court of
appeals reversed and remanded." On remand, Del Monte Dunes argued that,
22. The council found the proposal to be "conceptually satisfactory and in conformance with the
city's previous decisions regarding, inter alia, density, number of units, location on the property, and
access." Id.
23. The final plan devoted 17.9 of the 37.6 acres to public open space, 7.9 acres to open,
landscaped areas, and 6.7 acres to public and private streets (including public parking and access to the
beach). Only 5.1 acres were to be used for buildings. 526 U.S. at 696, 119 S. C. at 1632.




28. Id. The council's decision was not based on Del Monte Dunes' failure to meet formerly
specified demands. Instead, the council found that Del Monte Dunes had not provided for adequate
access (despite the fact thatit had twice attempted to meet the city's access demands by revision of the
plan), that the proposed development would damage the environment, and that the plan would endanger
the Smith's Blue Butterfly (even though the proposed development would stabilize the plant life on the
property). Del Monte Dunes argued, to no avail, for an extension of the land use permit in order to
address each of these concerns. 526 U.S. at 697-98, 119 S. Ct. at 1633.
29. Del Monte Dunes also claimed that the rejection was a violation of the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 698, 119 S. Ct. at 1633.
30. The court based its decision on Williamson Y. Hamilton Bank ofiJohnson City, 473 U.S. 172,
105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985). It dismissed the case because Del Monte Dunes had not obtained a definitive
decision from the city regarding how much development the city would allow, nor had Del Monte
Dunes sought compensation in state court. 526 U.S. at 698, 119 S. Ct. at 1633.
31. The court of appeals found that requiring the landowners to continue submitting proposals
would raise concerns about repetitive and unfair procedures. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, LTD. v.
City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1501-06 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 526 U.S. 687, 119 S. Ct. 1624
(1999); 526 U.S. at 698-99,119 S. Ct. 1633,1635. See also MacDonald, Sommer &Frates v. County
of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 106 S. Ct. 256 (1986). ,The court of appeals also found that Del Monte Dunes
was not required to pursue relief in state court before resorting to federal court because a compensatory
remedy was not available to the landowners in the State of California at the time that the city denied
the final plan. 920 F.2d at1506-07; 526 U.S. at 699, 119 S. Ct. at 1636. See also First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). For
20001
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although the city had the power to regulate the property, the city's actions
effectively denied them any opportunity to develop the parcel. 2 Del Monte Dunes
buttressed its argument with a detailed history of its attempts to develop the
property. It emphasized the fact that the city had continually changed its
requirements for development.3
The district court submitted the parties' claims to a jury. The court instructed
the jury to find for Del Monte Dunes if it found either that Del Monte Dunes had
been denied all economically viable use of the property, or that the city's denial of
the landowners' final proposal "did not substantially advance a legitimate public
purpose." 3' The jury returned a general verdict for Del Monte Dunes on its takings
claim."
The city appealed the decision, claiming: (1) the issue should not have been
submitted to a jury and (2) the jury instructions were improper. The appellate court
affirmed.3 It held that allowing the jury to decide Del Monte Dunes' regulatory
takings claim was proper because the plaintiff had a right to a jury trial under §
a discussion of ripeness and regulatory takings, see Julia C. Haffner, Suitum v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency: The United States Supreme Court Revisits Ripeness in the Regulatory Takings
Context, II Tul. Envti. L.J. 129 (1997).
32. 920 F.2d at 1506-07; 526 U.S. at 699, 119 S. Ct. at 1636.
33. Del Monte Dunes also introduced evidence that suggested that the city actually denied the
landowners' proposals because it wished to own the property. 526 U.S. at 699-700, 119 S. Ct. at 1633-
34.
34. The substantive due process claim was reserved for decision by the court. Id. Concerning the
first issue, the jury was instructed as follows:
For the purpose of a taking claim, you will find that the plaintiff has been denied all
economically viable use of its property, if, as the result of the city's regulatory decision there
remains no permissible or beneficial use for that property. In proving whether the plaintiff
has been denied all economically viable use of its property, it is not enough that the plaintiff
show that after the challenged action by the city the property diminished in.value or that it
would suffer a serious economic loss as the result of the city's actions.
Concerning the second issue, the jury received the following instruction?
Public bodies, such as the city, have the authority to take actions which substantially
advance legitimate public interest[s] and legitimate public interest[s] can include protecting
the environment, preserving open space agriculture, protecting the health and safety of its
citizens, and regulating the quality of the community by looking at development. So one
of your jobs as jurors is to'decide if the city's decision here substantially advanced any such
legitimate public puriose.
The regulatory actions of the city or any agency substantially advanc[e] a legitimate
public purpose if the action bears a reasonable relationship to that objective.
Now, if the preponderance of the evidence establishes that there was no reasonable
relationship between the city's denial of the... proposal and legitimate public purpose, you
should find in favor of the plaintiff. If you find that there existed a reasonable relationship
between the city's decision and a legitimate public purpose, you should find in favor of the
city. As long as the regulatory action by the city substantially advances their legitimate
public purpose; ... its underlying motives and reasons are not to be inquired into.
Id. at 700-01, 119 S. Ct. at 1634.
35. The jury rendered a separate verdict for Del Monte Dunes on its equal protection claim and
awarded damages of $1.45 million. The court ruled for the city on the substantive due process claim
(stressing that its ruling was not inconsistent with the jury verdicts). Id.
36. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422,1425 (9th Cir. 1996).
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1983." Further, whether the landowners had been denied all economically viable
use of the property and whether the city's denial of the final proposal advanced
legitimate public interests were suitable jury questions.3" The court reasoned that
these inquiries fell within a category of essentially factual questions and thus could
be submitted to the jury.3 9 The court also based its approval of the district court's
jury instructions partly on Dolan v. City of Tigard.' The court of appeals used the
"rough proportionality" test articulated in Dolan to decide whether a taking had
occurred.4'
The court of appeals found that the jury instruction mirrored the "rough
proportionality" test reasoning that the jurors were left with a reasonableness test
that had been described in Dolan as "essentially factual."' 3 Although it may have
been a mixed question of fact and law, the issue of whether the government's
actions were "reasonable" was the type that could be put to the jury." The court of
appeals then concluded that sufficient evidence had been presented to the jury to
support a finding for Del Monte Dunes.4
In its petition for certiorari, the city limited its questions to three: (1) whether
the court of appeals erred in applying the "rough proportionality" test from Dolan
to the case, (2) whether the court of appeals incorrectly based its decision on a
standard that allowed the jury to re-weigh the reasonableness of the city's
land-use decision, and (3) whether issues of liability were properly submitted to the
jury.,
III. HOLDING N DEL MoNTE DUNES47
A. Discussion of the Regulatory Takings Standard From Dolan 8
The Court first held that the Ninth Circuit's use of the "rough
proportionality" standard from Dolan was misplaced and did not apply to the Del
37. Id. at 1426-27.
38. Id. at 1430.
39. Id. at 1428.
40. 512 U.S. 374, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
41. 95 F.3d at 1429-30.
42. The jury was instructed to find that the city's actions substantially advanced a legitimate state
interest if it found that there was a "reasonable relationship" between the city's denial of the
landowners' application and a legitimate public purpose. Id. at 1429.
43. Id. at 1430.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1430-34.
46. City ofMonterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687,702, 119 S. Ct. 1624,1635
(1999).
47. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to part IV-A-2 of his opinion.
Id. at 693, 119 S. Ct. at 1631.
48. Justice Kennedy's opinion as to the use in Del Monte Dunes of the "rough proportionality"
standard from Dolan was the unanimous opinion of the Court. Id. at 692, 119 S. Ct. at 1630.
NOTES2000]
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Monte Dunes case.49 It refused to extend the "rough proportionality" test
beyond the context of exactions, the type of taking that had occurred in
Dolan. The Court defined exactions as land-use decisions where approval of
development depended upon the landowner dedicating a part of his property
to public use."0 However, the jury instructions relied upon by the lower
courts were found to be sound because at no point did they mention
proportionality or require that the jury find for Del Monte Dunes because the
city's actions were "roughly proportional" to its asserted interests." The
Court concluded that the appellate court's discussion of rough proportionality
was unnecessary to its decision and therefore, irrelevant to the disposition of
the case.52
B. Examination of Public Land-Use Policy
The Court then dismissed the city's argument that the court of appeals'
decision allowed the jury to second-guess public land-use policy.53 The Court
reasoned that the judgment of the district court did not address the
reasonableness of the city's general zoning laws or land-use policies because
the jury instructions addressed only the city's decision to deny Del Monte
Dunes' development proposal.' "In short, the question submitted to the jury
on this issue was confined to whether, in light of all the history and the
context of the case, the city's particular decision to deny Del Monte Dunes'
final development proposal was reasonably related to the city's proffered
justifications."" Therefore, the jury was not given the opportunity to second-
guess the city's land-use policy, but constrained to examine a particular zoning
decision.'
The Court underscored the fact that the city itself had proposed the
essence of the instructions given to the jury and as such, the city could not
contend that those instructions did not provide an accurate statement of the
law. It went on to explain that it had "provided neither a definitive
statement of the elements of a claim for a temporary regulatory taking nor a
thorough explanation of the nature or applicability of the requirement that a
regulation substantially advance legitimate public interests outside the context of
dedications or exactions. .. ."" The Court concluded that the jury instructions
were consistent with previous Supreme Court discussions of general regulatory
49. Id. at 701-03, 119 S. Ct. at 1635.
50. Id. at 702, 119 S. Ct. at 1635.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 704, 119 S. Ct. at 1636.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 706, 119 S. Ct. at 1637.
56. The Court stressed the fact that respondent stipulated that the city had the right to regulate
property. Id. at 705, 119 S. Ct. at 1636.
"57. Id. at 704, 119 S. Ct. at 1636.
58. Id.
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takings liability and, because the city did not challenge the validity of the prior
jurisprudence upon which the instructions were based, the Court refused to revisit
the precedents.59
C. The Role of the Jury
The Court then addressed whether it was proper for the district court to
submit the question of liability on Del Monte Dunes' regulatory takings
claim to the jury." According to the Court, the issue initially depended on
whether Del Monte Dunes had a statutory or constitutional right to a jury
trial.6' The first step in the Court's analysis examined the statute to
determine whether it granted a jury right, thus avoiding the constitutional
question.62 Del Monte Dunes argued that § 1983 granted a right to a jury trial
because the statute authorized a party who had been deprived of a federal right
under color of state law to seek relief through "an action at law."63 It further
asserted that the phrase "action at law" implied a jury right." The Court disagreed,
concluding that the statute did not confer upon the plaintiff the right to a jury trial.65
The Court then moved to the second part of its analysis: examination of the
Seventh Amendment to determine whether the right to a jury was granted by the
Constitution.'
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[iun suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be
preserved... , The Court held that "a § 1983 suit seeking legal relief is an
action at law within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment." It reasoned that the
jury guarantee of the Seventh Amendment extended to statutory claims unknown
at common law, as long as the claims could be said to "'soun[d] basically in tort,'
59. Id. The Court cited the following as prior jurisprudence: Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct 2886
(1992); Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825,107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 106 S. Ct. 455
(1985); and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
60. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 707, 119 S. Ct. 1624,
1637 (1999).
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 118 S. Ct. 1279
(1998); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987); and Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 94 S. Ct. 1005 (1974)).
63. 526 U.S. at 707, 119 S. Ct. at 1637.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 708, 119 S. Ct. at 1637.
66. Id., 119 S. Ct. at 1638.
67. U.S. Const. amend. VII. The Court's interpretation of the Seventh Amendment was guided
by historical analysis consisting of two questions: (1) was the cause of action tried at law at the time
of the founding or is it analogous to one that was, and (2) must the decision fall to the jury in order to
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791. Id., 119 S. Ct. at 1638.
68. Id. at 709, 119 S. Ct. at 1638.
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and seek legal relief." 9 The Court concluded that a suit brought under § 1983 met
both of these requirements.70
The Court then focused on whether the particular issues of liability were proper
for determination by the jury.7 It examined this issue in much the same way as it
had the previous questions: by undertaking an historical analysis to determine
whether the particular issues, or analogous ones, were decided by judge or by jury
in suits at common law at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted.72 "Where
history d[id] not provide a clear answer, [the Court] look[ed] to precedent andfunctional considerations." Using this analysis, the Court found no exact analogue
to Del Monte Dunes' suit at common law, or a precise analogue for the test of
liability submitted to the jury.74 The Court then looked to precedent to decide the
issue, noting that it had never specifically addressed the issue of proper allocation
of liability determinations between judge and jury in the regulatory takings
context." Therefore, it examined procedural and functional considerations. 6
The Court reasoned that predominantly factual issues are, in most cases, given
to the jury to decide." Specifically, in the context of regulatory takings, the
Supreme Court has often held that the determination of whether a regulation of
property goes so far that the eminent domain power should be invoked and
compensation paid, depends on the particular facts involved.7 ' Therefore, the issue
of whether a landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of his
property is a predominantly factual question, which should be left to the jury.79
However, the Court added that the question of whether a land-use decision
substantially advances legitimate public interests within the meaning of Supreme
Court regulatory takings doctrine is a more difficult determination; the question
69. Id. (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S. Ct. 1005 (1974)).
70. The Court recognized that a § 1983 claim sounded in tort. 526 U.S. at 709, 119 S. Ct. at
1638. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994); Memphis Community Sch. Dist.
v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473
(1961); and Monell v. New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). The Court found that the
second requirement, that the plaintiff seek legal relief, was met in Del Monte Dunes because the
constitutional injury alleged by the landowners was not that the property was taken, but that the property
was taken without compensation (because the State of California did not provide a compensatory
remedy). Therefore, Del Monte Dunes sought not only compensation but also damages for the
unconstitutional denial of these damages (damages for a constitutional violation are a legal remedy).
526 U.S. at 710, 119 S. Ct. at 1638-39. See Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 10 S. Ct. 1339 (1990).
71. 526 U.S. at 718, 119 S. Ct. at 1642.
72. Id., 119 S. Ct. at 1643.
73. Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview nstruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996)).
74. 526 U.S. at 718, 119 S. Ct. at 1643.
75. Id. at 719, 119 S. Ct. at 1643.
76. Id. at 720, 119 S. Ct. at 1643.
77. Id.
78. Id., 119 S. Ct. at 1644 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 1232
(1922); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987);
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978); and Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 112
S. Ct. 1522 (1992)).
79. 526 U.S. at 720, 119 S. Ct. at 1644.
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contains a legal aspect and should be understood as a mixed question of fact and
law.' Avoiding the creation of a general rule, the Court held that the specific jury
instruction in Del Monte Dunes was properly submitted to the jury because it was
submitted narrowly-to wit: "whether, when viewed in light of the context and
protracted history of the development application process, the city's decision to
reject a particular development plan bore a reasonable relationship to its proffered
justifications."'" The Court's approval was based on the reasoning of the court of
appeals that the jury instruction was "essentially fact-bound [in] nature."82
After reaching this conclusion, the Court limited its holding. It stated that it
was not addressing the role of the jury in an ordinary inverse condemnation
proceeding; it was not providing a precise demarcation of the areas allotted to judge
and jury; and it was not defining the elements of a temporary regulatory takings
claim.8" Instead, the holding was expressly limited to an action brought under §
1983.g
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Right To A Jury
The bulk of the Del Monte Dunes opinion was spent discussing the
existence of a jury right. 5 The issue was a prerequisite to its approval of
the lower court's holding that the city's action was a regulatory taking. The decision
could not have been upheld unless the landowners had a right to a jury trial on the
issue. A question left unanswered is what impact might the Del Monte Dunes
decision have in the courts in the future?
One possible concern is the complexity of regulatory takings jurisprudence.
Judges are better able than juries to properly apply the intricate analysis involved
in deciding whether a taking exists. 7 Juries might also be more sympathetic to
landowners, thereby increasing the cost of government through large awards.
Additionally, the number of regulatory takings cases could increase because of the
perceived advantage bestowed on plaintiffs by jury trials.
Working against the above concerns is the narrowness of the Court's holding




84. Id. The Court stressed that, in actions under § 1983, the jury had long been recognized as
an important part of the vindication proceeding.
85. Seeid. at707-55, 119S. Ct. at 1637-61.
86. See id. at 733,119 S. Ct. at 1650 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("A federal court commits enror by
submitting an issue to ajury over objection, unless the party seeking the jury determination has a right
to a jury trial on the issue."). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(aX2) (1994).
87. See Brief for Petitioner at 27, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 119 S.
Ct. 1624 (1999) (No. 97-1235); 526 U.S. at 754, 119 S. Ct. at 1660 (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[s]crutinizing the legal basis for governmental action is 'one of those things that judges often do and
are likely to do better than juries unburdened by training in exegesis.") (quoting Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1385 (1996)).
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in Del Monte Dunes."8 Nevertheless, a clarification of the standard used in
regulatory takings cases would help resolve the possible problems presented
by the Court's finding ofajury right. If the legal analysis used in regulatory takings
cases was clearly defined, the concerns raised by jury participation might be
alleviated by the proper allocation of legal and factual questions between the judge
and the jury.
B. The Regulatory Takings Standard
1. Background
The Supreme Court upheld the test contained in the jury instructions in
Del Monte Dunes and cited with approval the precedents upon which the
jury instructions were based. 9 These cases, cited by the Court in Del Monte
Dunes as "previous general discussions of regulatory takings liability," are
useful in illustrating some general guidelines evident in regulatory takings




a. Regulations that Compel a Physical Invasion
Courts will usually find that a taking has occurred if the regulation at issue
requires that the landowner suffer a physical invasion of his property.92 Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp. is an example of a case involving such a
regulation.93 In Loretto, a New York law forced landlords to permit a cable
television company to install its cable on their properties.9 The Supreme Court
ruled that this physical occupation of property was a taking.9" It reasoned that a
permanent physical invasion would be considered a taking "without regard to the
public interests that it may serve." "In such a case, the property owner entertains
a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the character of the invasion
is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property
regulation."
The Court in Loretto posited, in dicta, that temporary physical invasions should
88. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
89. 526 U.S. at 704, 119 S. Ct. at 1636.
90. Id. The jury instruction at issue in the Del Monte Dunes case was based on this line of cases
and was upheld by the Court.
91. Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CA TVCorp., 458 U.S. 419,102 S. Ct. 3164(1982) was
not cited by the Court in Del Monte Dunes as a "previous general discussion[ ] of regulatory takings
liability." 526 S. Ct. at 704, 119 S. Ct. at 1636.
92. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893
(1992).
93. 458U.S.419,102S. Ct. 3164(1982);seeasoLucas,505U.S. atlO15, 112S. Ct. at2893.
94. 458 U.S. at 421, 102 S. Ct. at 3168.
95. Id. at 421, 102 S. Ct. at 3168.
96. Id. at 426, 102 S. Ct. at 3171.
97. Id. at 441, 102 S. Ct. at 3179.
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be subjected to a balancing test that takes into account the state's interest.9 '
However, the balance should be pre-weighted in favor of the landowner because a
court should more readily find a taking when the interference can be characterized
as a physical invasion."
b. Regulations that Destroy All Economic Use
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council illustrates a type of regulation that
deprives the landowner of all economic use of his or her property.I" In Lucas, the
plaintiff purchased two lots on which he intended to build single-family homes.' 0 '
Two years later, the South Carolina Legislature enacted a law that prohibited Lucas
from placing any permanent habitable structures on either of his two tracts.10 2
The Court likened this type of regulation to a physical invasion of property.0 3
It stated that, like regulations compelling physical invasions, regulations that denied
all economic use of land were usually found to involve takings without a "case-
specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint."' 4 A
regulation that prohibited "all economically beneficial use of land" would effect a
taking unless "the proscribed use interests were not part of [the owner's] title to
begin with."'05 Therefore, according to the Court, a regulation that deprived a
landowner of all economic use of his or her property should "do no more than
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts by adjacent
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private
99106
nuisance....
c. Regulations that Condition Approval on Exactions
The Court examined another aspect of regulatory takings in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission. " In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission
said it would approve the plaintiffs' building plan only if the plaintiff transferred to
the public an easement across their property.' The Court recognized that if the
regulation did not deny the landowners "economically viable use" of their land, the
state could regulate the use of the plaintiff's land in order to "substantially advance
[a] legitimate state interest."'" Therefore, the city could deny the plaintiffs'
proposal if there was a legitimate state interest and the denial did not interfere too
98. Id. at 432, 102 S. Ct. at 3174.
99. Id. at 426, 102 S. Ct. at 3171.
100. 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
101. Id. at 1007, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1029, 112 S. CL at 2900.
104. Id. at 1015, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
105. Id. at 1027, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
106. Id. at 1029, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
107. 483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
108. Id. at 827, 107 S. Ct. at 3143.
109. Id. at 834, 107 S. Ct. at 3147.
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drastically with the landowners' use of the property."' Although the Court stated
that there was no set formula to decide whether a legitimate state interest existed,
it recognized scenic zoning, landmark preservation, and residential zoning to be
legitimate state interests."'
.The Court added a stipulation. If the city conditioned its approval on
an exaction, "[t]he evident constitutional propriety disappear[ed] ... if the
condition substituted for the prohibition utterly failted] to further the end
advanced as the justification for the [denial].""' 2 This relationship between
the state interest and the condition was described by the court as an "essential
nexus."'
113
The Court expanded on the Nollan reasoning in Dolan v. City of Tigard. "4 In
Dolan, the city conditioned its approval of the petitioner's application to expand her
store and pave her parking lot upon her dedication of part of her land for (1) a
public greenway along a creek that ran across the property and (2) a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway."' The Supreme Court used the case as an opportunity
to examine the required degree of connection between the exactions imposed by the
city and the projected impacts of the proposed development."' The Court used a
two-part test to evaluate the petitioner's claim: (1) did an "essential nexus" exist
between the "legitimate state interest" and the condition exacted by the city and (2)
was the required degree of connection present. "7 The Court adopted what it termed
a "rough proportionality" test that called for the municipality to show a "reasonable
relationship" between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed
development."' "[T]he city must [have made] some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication [was] related both in nature and extent
to the impact of the proposed development."" 9 The Court held that the city did not
meet its burden of demonstrating that its requirements reasonably related to the
impact of the proposed development.'20
110. Id. at 835-36, 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
111. Id. at 835,107 S. Ct. at 3147-48.
112. Id. at 837, 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
113. Id.
114. 512 U.S. 374,114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
115. Id. at380, 114 S. Ct. at2314.
116. Id. at377, 114S. Ct. at2312.
117. The first part of the test came from Nollan v. California Coastal Comm 'n, 483 U.S. 825,107
S. Ct. 3141 (1987). Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385, 114 S. Ct. at 2317. The Court developed the second part
of the test by examining several approaches taken by a number of states. Id., 114 S. Ct. at 2318-20.
118. 512 U.S. at391, 114 S. Ct. at2319.
119. Id. at391, 114S. Ct. at2319-20.
120. The Court found that although increasing the amount of impervious surface would increase
the amount and rate of storm water flow into the creek from petitioner's property, the city did not show
that its requirement of a public greenway would remedy the possible flood problem. Id. at 392-93, 114
S. Ct. at 2320-21. Regarding the bicycle/pedestrian pathway, the Court found that increasing the size
of the store would certainly increase the amount of traffic in the area but that the dedication of the
bicycle/pedestrian easement was not proven to be an effective solution. Id. at 395, 114 S. Ct. at 232 1-
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d Regulations that Merely Interfere with Property Rights
A landowner may be entitled to compensation if the regulation does not prevent
all economic use of the land, but instead creates a lesser infringement of property
rights. 2 ' The Court addressed such a situation in Agins v. City of Tiburon.2 ' In
Agins, a modification of the city's zoning requirements placed restrictions on the
number and type of dwellings that the plaintiffs could develop on their land. " The
landowners claimed that the city's re-zoning effected a taking of their property
without just compensation because it prevented development of the parcel and
"destroyed the value [of the land] ... for any purpose or use whatsoever.""2 The
Court did not examine specifically whether a taking had occurred on the plaintiffs'
property because at the time of the suit the landowners had not submitted a plan for
development of their property.' 2" Instead, the Court examined the facial validity of
the statute and determined that its mere enactment did not constitute a taking. 2 6
The Court stated that there was no precise rule to be used in this situation to
determine when a taking had occurred, but the inquiry called for a "weighing of
private and public interests" to determine whether "the public at large, rather than
a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public
interest."'2 7 Under this analysis, "[t]he application of a general zoning law to
particular property effect[ed] a taking if the ordinance d[id] not substantially
advance legitimate state interests... or denie[d] an owner economically viable use
of his land."' 28 Specifically, the Court found no taking inAgins because the zoning
requirements substantially advanced legitimate governmental goals by protecting
the public from the harms of urbanization.'29 Because the landowners had not
submitted a plan for approval, their specific interests were not placed on the scale.'3"
The Supreme Court again addressed the invasion of property rights by
regulation in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis." In
Keystone, the plaintiffs challenged a Pennsylvania statute that required fifty percent
of the 'coal beneath certain structures remain in place in order to support the
surface. '2 The Court held that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden in attempting
to prove that the statute amounted to a taking. ' The Court examined the two key
factors from Agins in determining whether a taking had occurred: (1) did the
regulation substantially advance a legitimate state interest and (2) did the regulation
121. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, n. 8, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895
(1992).
122. 447 U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
123. Id. at 257, 100 S. Ct. at 2140.
124. Id. at 258, 100 S. Ct. at 2140.
125. Id. at 260, 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
126. Id. at 260-63, 100 S. Ct. at 2141-43.
127. Id. at 260-61, 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
128. Id. at 260, 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
129. Id. at 261, 100 S. Ct. at 2142.
130. Id. at 260, 100 S. Ct. at 2141.
131. 480U.S.470, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
132. Id. at 476-78, 107 S. Ct. at 1237-38.
133. Id. at 473-98, 107 S. Ct. at 1236-48.
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deny the owner economically viable use of his land."'
In examining the state's interest, the Court emphasized the necessity of
determining the nature of the interest.'35 The Court underscored the importance of
the state's power to "preserv[e] the public weal [by] restricting the uses individuals
can make of their property."' 36 Therefore, scrutiny of the state's interest should not
be a judgment of the effectiveness of the legislation, but should focus on the
"operative provisions" of the regulation, not just its stated purpose, in assessing its
true nature. 37 To facilitate this analysis, the Court looked to the balancing test from
Agins to determine who should bear the "burden of an exercise of state power."
3
The Court ruled that the statute in Keystone sought to prevent public nuisance, an
interest which satisfied its test for validity.'39
The Court then examined the economic aspect of the regulation.?" In this
context, the Court discussed the importance of the posture of the particular claim,
recognizing that this could affect the analysis.' 4' If the plaintiff challenged the
specific application of a regulation, the Court would follow no "set formula" to
determine whether a taking had occurred."" Rather, the Court would "examine[]
the 'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have
identified several factors-such as the economic impact of the regulation [and] its
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations. . . ,,I If, on the
other hand, the issue before the court was the facial validity of a regulation, the
enactment of the regulation would constitute a taking if it denied the owner
economically viable use of his land.'" The Court determined that the posture of the
case in Keystone presented a challenge of the facial validity of the statute and the
plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving that they had been denied the
economically viable use of their property.1
45
2. Generally
Supreme Court jurisprudence dealing with takings has been called a
"bewildering array of rules."'" Commentators blame this confusion on the
Supreme Court's refusal to adopt a clear test to guide its takings cases.", 7 In Del
134. Id. at 484-85, 107 S. Ct. at 1241-42.
135. Id. at 488, 107 S. Ct. at 1243.
136. Id. at 491, 107 S..Ct. at 1245.
137. Id. at 487 n.16, 107 S. Ct. at 1243 n.16.
138. Id. at 492-93, 107 S. Ct. at 1246.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 493-97, 107 S. Ct. at 1246-48.
141. Id. at 493-95, 107 S. Ct. at 1246-47.
142. Id. at 495, 107 S. Ct. at 1247.
143. Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 499, 107 S. Ct. at 1249.
146. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility. andFairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundations
of "Just Compensation Law, "80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).
147. Harvard Law Review Association, The Principle of Equality in Takings Clause
Jurisprudence, 109 Harv. L Rev. 1030 (1996).
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Monte Dunes, the entire Court agreed that the "rough proportionality" standard
from Dolan did not apply to the situation involved in Del Monte Dunes.'" The
cynical reader might conclude that the Court denied the possibility of a clear
standard in order to perpetuate the confusion that surrounds regulatory takings
jurisprudence. However, the lack of a clear standard is a symptom, not the
generator, of the confusion. This lack of uniformity comes from the nature of
regulatory takings cases.
Evidence of the cause of confusion can be seen in the Del Monte Dunes
opinion. In denying the extension of the Dolan test, the Court stated that the test
was designed to determine whether dedications demanded "as conditions of
development [were] proportional to the development's anticipated impacts."
4 9
This test was not appropriate in Del Monte Dunes because it was not "readily
applicable to the much different questions arising where . . . the landowner's
challenge [was] based not on excessive exactions but on denial of development."' 0
Herein lies the problem; the analysis used in one case is often inapplicable in
another because it is tailored to the particular facts presented in each situation.
Many cases involving regulatory takings, by their nature, can only be determined
after examination of their "particular facts." '' In order to decide whether a taking
exists in these cases, the court must employ a balancing test, taking into account the
interests of the property owner and the state.152 The Court must place the facts on
either side of the scale in order to weigh the interests of the public and the
landowner to decide who should bear the cost of the regulation." In an evolving
society, the need for a unique test in each case is further bolstered by the fact that
the importance of each fact may change, giving more or less weight to some
interests. Indeed, the choice of where to place the fact on the scale will also be
affected because "circumstances may so change in time... as to clothe with such
a [public] interest what at other times . would be a matter of purely private
concern."'!
3'. Guidelines
Even though the nature of a regulatory taking defies the creation of a specific
test for its existence, some guidelines are evident in the Court's analyses. The
analysis is generally a balancing test. On one side of the scale rest the interests of
the landowner. The competing interests of the state are placed on the other side of
the balance. The character of the regulatory taking can be used to determine the
default setting of the balance.
If the taking involves a compelled physical invasion or deprives the landowner
148. 526 U.S. 687, 702-03, 119 S. Ct. 1624, i635 (1999).
149. 526 U.S. at 703, 119 S. Ct. at 1635.
150. Id.
151. Tribe, supra note 4, at 595.
152. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260-61, 100 S. Ct. 2138,2141 (1980).
153. Id.
154. Keystone Bitimunous Coal Ass'n v. De Bendictis, 480 U.S. 470,488, 107 S. Ct. 1232,1243
(1987) (citing Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155, 41 S. Ct. 458,459 (1921)).
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of all economic use of his or her property, the scale will be heavily pre-weighted in
favor of the landowner.'55 In this situation, a determination that the regulation
compels a physical invasion of property will usually conclude the balancing test in
favor of the landowner without a consideration of state interests.'- A similar
determination that the regulation deprives the landowner of all economic use of his
or her property will usually tip the scale in favor of the landowner as well, unless
the state's interest is one inherent in the title to the property in question.'"
Likewise, if the regulation is conditioned upon an exaction of property, the
scale's default setting will tip in favor of the landowner (although much less so than
if the regulation caused a physical invasion or deprivation of economic use of the
property)." The state interest involved in the dispute should first be examined to
discern whether it is legitimate.'59 If the interest is valid, the regulation must be
determined to be sufficiently connected to it to substantially advance the interest
involved. " If the preceding requirements are met, the interest will be placed on the
scale. On the other side of the scale, the landowner's interest will be examined to
determine whether the regulation has denied him or her economically viable use of
the land. 6'
If the regulation involved in the dispute concerns a lesser deprivation of
property rights, the scale should be evenly set at the start. 62 In this situation, the
broad questions are the same: (1) does the regulation advance a legitimate state
interest and (2) does the regulation deny the landowner economic use of his or her
land. This situation is unique because of the weighing process itself. Because the
balance is set evenly, the process is more complex-focusing, with greater
emphasis, on the specific facts of each case.
4. The Del Monte Dunes Decision In This Context
Although the Court in Del Monte Dunes found that the lower court should not
have used the Dolan test, it approved the court's final decision. 63 The above
discussion is helpful in clarifying this ruling.
The district court instructed the jury to find in favor of Del Monte Dunes if it
found that (1) Del Monte Dunes had been denied all economically viable use of its
land or (2) the city's rejection of Del Monte Dunes' development proposal did not
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose.'" If the jury found the former
155. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
156. Id.
157. Id.




162. See supra notes 125-150 and accompanying text.
163. City ofMonterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687,703, 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1635
(1999).
164. Id. at 700, 119 S. Ct. at 1634; City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 95 F.3d
1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1996).
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to be true, the case would have fallen into the category of regulatory takings in
which the scale is weighted heavily in favor of the landowner because the
landowner had been denied all economic use of his or her land. 163
In that situation, a finding in favor of Del Monte Dunes would have been
proper because the city presented no interest that would have been inherently
present in the landowners' title. Therefore, the scale should have tipped in favor of
Del Monte Dunes.
In the alternative, if the jury found that the city's denial of the development
proposal did not substantially advance a legitimate public purpose, the case would
have been categorized as one involving mere interference with property rights.'"
In this circumstance, the interests of the landowner and the city would have been
weighed on an evenly set scale. However, the city's interests would not have been
placed on the scale if they were not advanced by the regulation. 67 Such a finding
would have tipped the scale in favor of Del Monte Dunes. Therefore, the Del
Monte Dunes Court correctly upheld the decision of the lower court because an
affirmative answer to either of the jury questions could have been supported by the
evidence and such an answer would have compelled a finding for Del Monte Dunes.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the generalities discussed above are helpful, they hardly take the
place of a clear set of standards. The Del Monte Dunes case and the authority
contained therein illustrate the difficulty of fashioning a specific test to deal with
regulatory takings. However, the Supreme Court should be mindful that the general
principles involved in these cases should be clearly articulated in order to guide
analysis. As concerns over the use of property move to the forefront, the need for
clarity in the area of regulatory takings will become increasingly crucial. For this
reason, Del Monte Dunes should be considered a missed opportunity. The Court
should endeavor to fashion a clear, workable test-soon.
Mark Mahaffey
165. See supra notes 106-112 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 127-152 and accompanying text.
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